Posted by: Christian | July 13, 2008

Why Nuristan Matters

The short answer to this would be to just show you the Nuristan-Kunar anti-coalition infiltration corridor that crosses the Pakistani border. Via page 65 of Antonio Giustozzi’s book Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop:

Nuristan Taliban

Nuristan Taliban

Show this map to an old Soviet officer who served in the region and he will tell you that those routes look exactly like the mujahideen infiltration routes from the 1980s. But even before the Soviet invasion Nuristan was in revolt against the Communist government in May 1978.[1] Some of the Nuristani elite, since the region’s forced conversion to Islam after the invasion of the army of the Afghan Amir Abdurrahman in 1895-96,[2] were given a favored position in Afghan government, especially in the Afghan military.[3] Louis Dupree, in the 1970s, provided a version of the “ethnic pecking order in Afghanistan: Pashtun, Tajik, Nuristani, Uzbek, Turkmen, Aimaq, and then Hazara at the bottom.[4] The new Communist government purged these Nuristanis (or they fled from Kabul with their lives, if they were lucky). But given the fragmented nature of Nuristan (a region with a great deal of diversity) the initial revolt could have had more to do with local issues than with the dire situation of one of those army officers with the surname “Nuristani.”

Photo by Max Klimburg of Nuristani Village in Waigal Valley:

Waigal Nuristan

Waigal Nuristan

Religion is, to grossly understate it, a very important factor in the recent history of Nuristan. Originally home to a host of deities, the Muslim invasion marked the end of the polytheistic beliefs. The Muslim army destroyed the temples, shrines, effigies and numerous ancestor figures while mullahs were imported to “re-educate” the population. They did face difficulties in destroying the traditional belief system but eventually triumphed over the local beliefs.[5] The region, previously referred to by outsiders as Kafiristan (Land of the Infidels) was renamed Nuristan (Land of Light/Enlightenment). But this was not the final conversion, there came another wave of “conversion.” Antonio Giustozzi notes that Nuristan was “colonized” by Salafis by the 1990s.[6] Klimburg refers to this influence as Wahhabi (loosely, a Saudi brand of Salafism):

“Islam is on the rise also in Nuristan, where one finds nowadays an ever increasing number of haji, for the most part unemployed, and mullahs educated in different madrassas in Pakistan. The northern valleys even have gone through a period of ‘re-Islamisation’, as they were converted to Wahhabism. Wahhabi and other religious village schools provide some education, and several of the local mullahs now pride themselves on having completed higher religious studies in Saudi Arabia. In most parts of present-day Nuristan, music and dance, once greatly cherished and widely performed, have virtually disappeared, the victims of Sunni or Wahhabi fundamentalism.”[7]

Pre-Islamic ancestor effigies at a burial ground (source):

As far as the Taliban was concerned, it was better to strike a deal with the local power brokers in Nuristan than to invade. After the fall of the Taliban government the same pattern was repeated with no “strongman” who could prevent the continuing fragmentation in Nuristan post 2001. The weak central government, like the Taliban, instead made arrangements with various local leaders. (pg 64) But early in the post-2001 era anti-coalition foreign fighters were already active in Nuristan as well as Khost, Paktika and Kunar. Giuztozzi claims that by 2002-3 insurgents in Nuristan operated with little check on their activities.[8]

So what of the current situation in Nuristan? Nuristan is like another Afghanistan within Afghanistan. To make any generalizations about a region with such a high level of diversity, based on the available published material, is quite risky. Even Richard Strand, one of the very few authorities on Nuristan, admitted he had recently provided incorrect analysis because of a deceptive source. What seems to be clear is that the situation is “not good.”

And on the military front? Anti-coalition forces here are both from Pakistan and local. How many? Giustozzi estimated, based on press reports, UN, US military and NATO/ISAF sources, that there were about 200 fighters in Nuristan in 2006.[9] They seem to have a high level of capability, according to Abu Muqawama. The situation today? Who knows.

The situation in Nuristan, aside from the conflict, is quite dire. The region is isolated, underdeveloped, neglected and has undergone environmental devastation, as you can see from this satellite image of tree cover:

The environmental analysis can be found here.

Here’s a bibliography for Nuristan that I’m continually updating for The Afghanistan Analyst:

Nuristan:

Books

Cacopardo, Alberto M., and Ruth Laila Schmidt (2006) (eds.): My Heartrendingly Tragic Story. ShaikhMuhammad Abdullah Khan ‘Azar’. Oslo.

Edelberg, Lennart (1984): Nuristani Buildings, Aarhus.

Edelberg, Lennart, and Schuyler Jones. 1979. Nuristan. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

Jettmar, Karl (1975): Die Religionen des Hindukusch (with contributions by Schuyler Jones and Max Klimburg). Stuttgart

Jettmar, Karl (1986): The Religions of the Hindukush. Vol. 1: The Religion of the Kafirs. London (revised translation of Jettmar 1975), pp. 155-202

Jones, Schuyler. 1966/1969. An Annotated Bibliography of Nuristan (Kafiristan) and the Kalash Kafirs of Chitral. 2 parts, Copenhagen.

Jones, Schuyler. 1974. Men of Influence in Nuristan. London and New York: Seminar Press.

Klimburg, Max 1999. The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush: Art and Society of the Waigal and Ashkun Kafirs. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Robertson, George Scott (1896): The Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush. London.

Scheibe, Arnold (1937) (ed.): Deutsche im Hindukusch. Bericht der Deutschen Hindukusch-Expedition 1935 der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Berlin.

Snoy, Peter (1962): Die Kafiren. Formen der Wirtschaft und geistigen Kultur. Frankfurt.

Articles, reports, and book chapters

Buddruss, Georg (1960): “Zur Mythologie der Prasun-Kafiren”, in: Paideuma 7, pp. 200-209.

Buddruss, Georg (1974): “Some Reflections on a Kafir Myth”, in: Karl Jettmar and Lennart Edelberg (eds.), Cultures of the Hindukush. Selected Papers from the Hindu-Kush Cultural Conference held at Moesgård, 1970, Wiesbaden, pp. 31-6.

Buddruss, Georg. 1987 ‘Ein Ordal der Waigal-Kafiren des Hindukusch’, Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure, 41, 1987, pp. 31 - 43.

de Bures, Alain. (n.d.). ‘Historique de la succession de con its qui opposent les communaute´s de Koustoz et de Kamdesh au Nouristan-est et qui a abouti a` la destruction des quatre villages de Koustoz’, Unpublished manuscript, MADERA.

Dupree, Louis. 1978. ‘Nuristani’, in Richard V. Weeks (editor), Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press.

Edelberg, Lennart. 1960. ‘Statues de bois rapportées du Kafiristan à Kabul après la conquête de cette province par l’Emir Abdul Rahman en 1895/96′, Arts Asiatiques 7(4), pp. 243-86.

Edelberg, L. 1965. ‘Nuristanske Sølvpokaler’, Kuml Yearbook for the Jutland(?) Archaeological Society, Aarhus 1965, pp. 153 - 201.

Katz, David J. 1984. ‘Responses to Central Authority in Nuristan: the case of the Vaygal Valley Kalasha’, in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan. M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (editors). Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

Klimburg, Max. 1990. “Kulturformen bei den Kafiren des Hindukusch”, in: Mitteilungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte, vol. 11, pp. 47-60.

Klimburg, Max. 2001. ‘The situation in Nuristan’, Central Asian Survey, 20(3): 383-390.

Klimburg, Max. 2001. ‘The present situation in Nuristan’, in Christine Noelle, Conrad Schetter, and Reinhard Schlagintweit (editors), Afghanistan - A Country without a State? Frankfurt am Main.

Klimburg, Max. (No date). ‘Between Myth and Reality: How Legendary Kafiristan became Nuristan,’ Fikrun wa Fann (Art and Thought) Vol. 78. Online: http://www.qantara.de/uploads/540/FWF_78_Between_Myth_and_Reality.pdf

Klimburg, Max. 2002. ‘The Arts and Culture of Parun, Kafiristan’s “Sacred Valley”‘, Arts Asiatiques 57: 51-68.

Klimburg, Max. 2004. ‘The Arts and Societies of the Kafirs of the Hindu Kush’, Central Asian Affairs 35.3: 365-386.

Sarianidi, V. 1999. ‘Near Eastern Aryans in Central Asia’, Journal of Indo-European Studies 27.3-4: 295-326.

Strand, R. 1974. ‘A Note on Rank, Political Leadership and Government among the Pre-Islamic Kom.’ In: K. Jettmar and L.Edelberg, eds., Cultures of the Hindukush. Wiesbaden, pp. 57 - 63.

Strand, Richard F. 1984 ‘The Evolution of Anti-Communist Resistance in Eastern Nuristan,’ in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan. M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (editors), pages 77-93. Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

Strand, Richard F. 1984. ‘Nuristanis’, in Muslim Peoples. (2nd Edition), ed. Richard V. Weekes, 2: 569-574. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Strand, Richard. 2006. ‘Topics in Vâsi Ethnography by Zaman Xân’, last revised in 2006: http://users.sedona.net/~strand/Nuristani/VasiCulture/ZamanXan.html

Strand, Richard F. 2003-07. ‘The Current Political Situation in Nuristan’, Richard Strand’s Nuristan Site. Available online at: http://users.sedona.net/~strand/Current.html

Dissertations and Theses

Brillet, Marie. 1998. ‘Study of the socio-political organisation and identification of village organisations in the Wama-Parun valley (Nuristan, Afghanistan)’, Unpublished MA thesis. Paris, Universite Paris I (Institut d’Etude du Developpement ) and MADERA.

Katz, David J. 1982. Kafir to Afghan: Religious Conversion, Political Incorporation, and Ethnicity in the Vaigal Valley, Nuristan. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

Keiser, R. Lincoln. 1971. Social Structure and Social Control in Two Afghan Mountain Societies. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Rochester.

Nuristani, Ahmad Yusuf. 1992. Emergence of Ulama as Political Leaders in the Waigal Valley: The Intensification of Islamic Identity. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arizona.

[1] Vincent Schneiter, ‘La guerre de liberation au Nuristan’, Les temps modernes, special issue July-August. 1980.

[2] Max Klimburg. (No date). ‘Between Myth and Reality: How Legendary Kafiristan became Nuristan,’ Fikrun wa Fann (Art and Thought) Vol. 78. Online: http://www.qantara.de/uploads/540/FWF_78_Between_Myth_and_Reality.pdf; p. 15

[3] Dorronsoro, Gilles. 2005. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press: p. 32-3.

[4] Louis Dupree. 2002 Reprint. Afghanistan. Oxford University Press: p. 161.

[5] Klimburg, p.15-16.

[6] Giustozzi, Antonio. 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 64.

[7] Klimburg, p. 19.

[8] Giustozzi, pp. 35, 64.

[9] Giustozzi, p. 68

Posted in Afghanistan, Ethnicity, Insurgents, Local Players, Military, Society/Culture | Tags: ,

« American Madrassa Victims
China’s Entry into Afghanistan »

Responses

I am of the opinion that Nuristan, aside from being strategically vital, is one of the most interesting places on Earth, given its history. Every single time I read something new about it, I’m stunned by how incredible it is (I just got done trying to explore what Marco Polo recounting, probably from hearsay, in “the region of Pashai,” which was south and east of “Badashan”).

For our purposes here, it might be worthwhile to link as well to Strand’s account of Anvar Amin’s leadership of the initial 1978 revolt against the communists in Kunar and Nuristan.

http://users.sedona.net/~strand/Nuristani/Kamkata/Kom/KomTexts/AnvarJihad.html

By: Joshua Foust on July 13, 2008
at 3:23 pm

GOA-

Is there any reason why the Nuristanis worked in the Afghan military? Are they more warlike than the already warlike Pashtun? Did they have any particular expertise? Do they still have that expertise? If so, what sort of threat are they?

By: smitteneagle on July 13, 2008
at 8:58 pm

Smitteneagle,

From what I have read, the reason that the Nuristanis were prominent in the military (I believe in the officer corps) was the practice of the central government “compelling” some of the elites in Nuristan to send their sons to Kabul to receive an education and (for some) to join the military. This would be along the lines of what many empires have done, most prominently with the Turks who went from “kidnapped” soldiers for the Arabs to military rulers. It also seems similar to the historical practice of having children of elites of recently suppressed regions having their sons taken as “quasi-hostages” to ensure “good behavior.”

As far as them being “warlike;” no more than anybody else in the Hindu Kush in my opinion. Previously there was much stereotyping of them by outsiders, especially considering that they weren’t Muslims.

I don’t feel that the Nuristanis are a “threat,” but the people hiking through there region from Pakistan certainly are (to the Nuristanis and to coalition forces). I would be lying if I said I knew how many locals are involved in the insurgency. I’ve never been there and I don’t have any access to that sort of info.

By: GOA on July 14, 2008
at 12:32 am

One other thing of interest to note. Did you notice how all of the dissertations involve the Waigal Valley? Is that area simply more populated and/or friendlier to outsiders? Or is there some other reason research on the province has been so relatively limited (Obvious exceptions, such as the contested valleys in upper Kunar, of course, excepted)?

By: Joshua Foust on July 14, 2008
at 1:43 am

I spent my last few months in Afghanistan in southern Nuristan. I had some minor dealings with the Police Chief of Waygal District. The Afghan government, accompanied by coalition forces, are making more inroads into areas that were previously ungoverned, causing problems along the infiltration routes.

Nuristanis, like other Afghans, generally just want to be left in peace. The primary resource of Nuristan is gems, and gem trafficking is illegal per government decree. That obviously doesn’t mean that the gem trade has disappeared. It has simply gone underground. The gems, like opium, have to traverse areas outside of government control. What is not government controlled is controlled by the ACM, be it Taliban or another force.

Many government officials also have ties to the gem trade, bringing them into contact with and the influence of Taliban elements.

Many Nuristanis want nothing to do with the Taliban, but also cannot permit strong government control, as it will interfere with their main industry, which is illegal.

Due to it’s remoteness, the provincial government is largely cut off from oversight and coalition mentoring. Corruption, rumors of corruption, and the lack of oversight, make it difficult to determine the true conditions of the Nuristani government. The governor himself cannot be assumed to be pro-coalition.

As noted above, there is a significant presence of outsiders, including a significant number of Arab speakers, who move into and through the area. Nuristani males are recruited to perform missile attacks against IRoA and coalition targets, and IED’s are not uncommon, sometimes focused on softer IRoA targets. Taliban numbers are small but influential.

While the international game is played, local politics are complex as well. One village had an armed conflict with another village resulting in the loss of three lives over pine nut harvesting.

There are many intrigues about which I am not at liberty to write at this point involving twisted relationships between local government officials and Taliban leadership. The people of Nuristan, with no easy way to go, go where the work is and the path that appears to grant them and their families the ability to live most unmolested.

By: Old Blue on July 14, 2008
at 5:25 am

The research was done in Waygal in part because that was where two bright students were from who had connected with the Danes and Germans who were doing research in the region. They subsequently studied anthropology in the U.S. and then actively assisted researchers in pursuing their own research. One of those men paid with his life for his generous efforts to assist.

Only three dissertations are generally available: those of Yusuf Nuristani, A. R. Palwal, and David Katz. Schuyler Jones and Oxford (I believe) did not make Jone’s dissertation available. The European researchers were ethnologists and did not seriously focus on the contemporary situation to any serious extent.

Getting permission to visit, much less conduct research in Nuristan was difficult and subject to the whims of Afghan officials. In the mid-60s it was possible for tourists to travel up the Landay Sin. There were tourist facilities at Kamu, site of the Zahir Shah’s hunting lodge. Extended fieldwork by foreigners was largely out of the question. Strand and Katz were lucky.

Strand worked in the east. He hasn’t yet finished his dissertation. Western Nuristan was difficult to access. No researcher of any stripe has done anything on Mandol district. Klimburg is not an ethnographer, but he has worked and traveled throughout Nuristan, except in Mandol and Doab.

As for why the Nuristanis were officers, GOA is partially correct. The Amir or king brought up boys that were called Ghulam Bacha (or slave boys) and also women for their harem. There were several prominent Mohammadzais who had Nuristani mothers.

There was a symbiotic relation between the Nuristanis and the Mohammadzais: the Mohammadzais liked and trusted the Nuristanis because they are not Pashtuns and were not caught up in intra-Pashtun intrigues. And the Nuristanis looked to the center to protect them against their local enemies, the nearby Pashtuns who had been their traditional enemies.

This special relationship was strengthened during the Safi Pashtun uprising of 1947. Sardar Daoud was the Minister of War. He traveled from Laghman into central Nuristan and joined up with the Nuristanis to defeat decisively the Safi in the central Pech.

This sealed a tight relationship between Daoud and the Nuristanis. When he was President, Daoud’s Interior Minister was a Nuristani from western Nuristan.

Also, there’s another angle: For many Afghans, the Nuristanis are still seen as still imbued with a wild streak and and readiness to brutally kill their enemy. This is rather silly, but even before the turmoil of the last 30 years, many well-educated Afghans trembled at the thought of having anything to do with the ‘wild’ Nuristanis and they felt that if they were forced to travel to Nuristan for official business, the prospects of them returning alive were nil.

There’s nothing special about Waygal

By: David on July 14, 2008
at 11:44 pm

“The gems, like opium” -Old Blue…

Unless you mean opium is precious ‘like a gem,’ then it is not in fact a gem. The region being highly mountaineous surely does have ‘ore’ deposits. But seing how the area was developed when the sub-continent crashed into Asia, such action was not likely to produce gems easily reachable and would render them deep within the mountainside.

Albeit not impossible for the locals to get to, they are also not very easy to get to with local technology.

By: Harry Toor on July 16, 2008
at 9:29 pm

[...] years ago before the Royal Marines pulled out.  Ghosts of Alexander has a very timely post on the importance of Nuristan in the guerillas’ strategy, mirroring comments from the recently-deposed governor of Nuristan [...]

By: Nuristan outpost evacuated « Bikes and Bullets on July 16, 2008
at 10:42 pm

Harry Toor is simply wrong in stating that gems in Nuristan are not easily reachable. Any serious mineralogist or gem collector is familiar with the incredible localities in both Nuristan and in northern Pakistan. Nuristani Kunzites and Tourmalines have been known for decades.

For anyone who wants to see a bit about Nuristan’s gems, I suggest:

Bariand and Poullen, The Pegmatites of Laghman, Nuristan, Afghanistan, The Mineralogical Record,
vol. 9 no. 5, pp. 301-308 1978

(Note the date on that article.)

Also Gary Bowersox has discussed Nuristani gems in his various articles and publications.

In addition, there are numerous mineralogical sites on the Internet that catalog the localities and minerals associated with Nuristan.

I suppose Harry Toor can insist that he’s right in that these precious stones can’t simply be picked off the ground but require some sweat and (non-local) tools to harvest. Perhaps so, but Nuristan’s abundant mineral resources can be readily collected using artisanal mining techniques such as simple gas-powered rock drills, compressor driven drills, and even only sledge hammers and chisels. This has been done for decades.

Sadly, the beneficiaries of this spectacular and valuable resource are neither the government (which according to Afghan law has claim to sub-surface resources) nor the local people who work the sites.

The main beneficiaries are traders and outsiders who have access to capital to purchase and supply the rock drills and explosives and the wherewithal to market the products. Most of these are Panjshiris, Pakistanis or Pashtuns, some of whom are linked to anti-government elements.

(In that regard, it is thought that in Nuristan, especially Doab district where there are numerous ‘mines,’ there is collusion between the Jihadis and the mining interests to thwart the expansion of the government and Coalition presence out of fear that a legitimate administrative presence could restrict the clandestine mining and transport of these precious stones.)

Most of Nuristan’s gems and minerals make their way to the world market through Pakistan.

If one visits the world-famous annual gem and mineral show in Tucson he will find numerous items from Nuristan on display and for sale.

By: David on July 17, 2008
at 12:05 am

- David

No, you’re right, Nuristan is famous for it’s gems. Having never been there though, I can’t attest to their ability to be mined.

I do wonder though, have those ‘precious’ gems on the market arrived there, in larger quantities, before or after the Taliban controlled Afghanistan. I would assume that they wanted to harness the profits yielded from the mining, at the same time if not able to harness it, destroy Nuristans ability to harvest it.

By: Harry Toor on July 17, 2008
at 1:20 am

Whether it’s gems or lumber, valuables from Nuristan reach markets through persons who have the means to play this intermediary role. In most cases this requires a set of skills and knowledge of the outside world and markets that few in Nuristan have.

Few Taliban had those skills but the traders were not beyond working with and teaming with Taliban, Communists, Mujahidin, or anyone else if they could go about their business.

There are some Nuristanis who are prominent in the gem business, but most of the biggest traders are those who already had other links into the trade. As a result there are several prominent Panjshiris and also several non-Nuristani Afghans and Pakistanis who have connections with the vibrant gem and mineral trade headquartered in Peshawar.

Be cautious in imputing motives to the Taliban that would suggest a coherent policy on their part. The Taliban were so disorganized that it’s safe to assume that one rupee of profit from Nuristan’s mineral business never reached the Taliban government coffers, if such existed.

They got their support from other sources. That’s not to say that individual Taliban officials in eastern Afghanistan didn’t profit from the gem business.

By: David on July 17, 2008
at 2:03 am

David here is extremely knowledgeable about this area, i would not be surprised if I know who he is. Spent some time in this area myself. If it wasn’t for the war, this is an extremely beautiful part of the world absent the extreme poverty.

By: CM on July 30, 2008
at 1:06 am

As a Nuristani, I would like to thank Christian for his excellent job in preparing the ground for this wonderful constructive discussions and debate about my motherland. I encourage you guys to raise any questions you may have regarding Nuristan.
I will try my level best to provide positive feedbacks and answers. As some coming from Nuristan, I will try to share my first-hand knowledge, experience and opinions.
Someone asked the reason for why Nuristanis were more successful and recruited in the army. There were many reasons.
First: Recruiting Nuristanis in the army did not pose any threat to the ruling Pashton authority for they did not trust Pashtuns and Tajiks since posed threat of stripping the king from his power. Second: by putting Nuristanis in the military hierarchy, the central government wanted to ensure that Nuristanis don’t initiate rebellions against the central government since government used the sons of Nuristani elites in the army as hostage and a good means to discourage any opposition from Nuristanis.
Third: the central government wanted to preach Islam through these “Gulam Bacha” who were in the military and would eventually go to their people and enlighten them with Islam.
Fourth: Nuristanis were physically well built and attractive who suited well to wander around the “Aarg” (presidential palace) well groomed. Personally, I know someone who was recruited, just because of his look and physical appearance, by either King Zahir Shah or Prime Minister Dawud to guard the front door of the king’s office.
Fifth: Inherently, Nuristanis are honest and loyal. Coming from pure nature and mountainous area, they are not polluted with trick skills as opposed to other ethnic groups. So they were trust worthy to the central government. Nuristanis proved this many times, one during the mid 20th century when the Safis rebelled against King Zahir Shah. My grandfather was killed in that war when he ran out of bullets after killing several insurgents.

By: Sami on August 20, 2008
at 2:54 am

Leave a response






Your response:

Categories