In my never-ending quest to ensure that I never get granted any sort of government clearance I occasionally hang out with political Islamists. I was talking with one of my bearded friends lately and he said this:

“You know, capitalism and socialism both have good things, but also very bad things. Islam takes only the good things from both capitalism and socialism, and takes none of the bad things. That is why it is the best system for government.”

Before you jump to any conclusions, I’ll just say that this guy hates the Taliban and the old Jihadi lslamist parties more than you could possibly imagine. And you might have heard this type of thing before. It’s hardly an original thought as it has been previously articulated by other proponents of political Islam, and of Islam in general.

This exchange is an example of how the idea of political Islam can endure. The old Jihadi parties in Afghanistan, and more recently the Taliban, have dragged the idea of Islam as a political system through the mud. But still the idea endures. Why? Because for an educated Islamist, the example of some backwards barely-educated refugee camp kids failing at building effective governance does not disprove the feasibility of political Islam. Nor does the example of some self-serving early 1990s Mujahideen. Nor does the example of those Shia next door. Nor does the example of some hypocritical ruling family speaking in the language of political Islam disprove anything about political Islam.

Imagine telling a communist that North Korea is proof that Communism doesn’t work. Tell a conservative that the Bush administration is proof that conservative government doesn’t work. Tell a socialist that 1970s Britain is proof that socialism is a joke. Tell an Oglala Sioux that the 1970s tribal government of Dick Wilson shows that Native Americans are incapable of self-governance. The answer to all these would be to say that these proove nothing about an entire system of governance. The Communist will say that true Communism has never been implemented. The socialist will say that there are plenty of better examples. The conservative will say that Bush has never implemented the true policies of conservative government. And the Sioux will say that you are racist and that they now have much more effective and accountable government structures in place.

Similarly, the political Islamist will not be deterred by a few examples that they do not consider to be true political Islam. And he will still see the realistic possibility of an honest, incorruptible government that unifies Muslims in peace and cooperation. And many of them do not see the need to implement the system through violent means.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of what is left on the insurgent side of Hizb-i Islami Hekmatyar (many Hizbis defected to the Karzai government), does an “interview” for CBS. But not really. It’s just an address by Hekmatyar. You got three minutes to waste? Gulbuddin has those three minutes for you:

That was some rather boring, unoriginal and not very insightful posturing. The rumored to be dead Jalaluddin Haqqani recently rose from the grave (looking like crap) to narrate the video of a Haqqani & Son super-massive suicide truck bombing of an ANA post that killed two Americans. Hekmatyar, on the other hand,….. well, never mind. It’s not even worth my time.

The only thing worth noting is the international tone of his monologue. He sounds like he’s speaking mostly to a foreign audience. But like I said; posturing. Strong and persistent rumor has it that he is negotiating with the Karzai government (and a weaker and less persistent rumor had it that his “people” gave some assistance to the non-Hizbis who attacked the Karzai parade). And what will change if he reaches an agreement? I would like to say very little will, but I don’t have access to the info that the Afghan intel guys and the US Army have. Will his commanders (number?) on the ground just look elsewhere for goodies if Hekmatyar quits the game? So without knowing exactly what’s going on in Hekmatyar’s hideout in Pakistan and in Kunar, Nuristan, etc.. I will just say that I will trade you seven Hekmatyars for one Sirajuddin Haqqani.

So that’s $200,000 divided by seven. You do the math.

I do like the small print though: “You may be…” and “Up to.” I wonder what the Pashto version reads? “Inshallah, you may might possibly get some money.”

Also please do not attempt to turn in Los Angeles morning radio show host Adam Corolla and claim that he is Siraj Haqqani. Seriously, do a quick comparison of the two.

Anyways, here’s a report with excerpts of the Haqqani video that show a grinning German Turk going of to martyrdom:

And more complete story is here.

OK, no more Bill Roggio imitations from me. I promise more pseudo-anthropology and less speculation on jihadi chicanery.

On occasion, due to the nature of their studies, social scientists do put themselves at risk. This was sadly evident yesterday with the death of Michael Bhatia in Khost province, Afghanistan. Bhatia, a PhD student at Oxford, was embedded with American troops at FOB Salerno in Khost when he was killed along with six others. This report does not name anybody but it is obviously the incident in question.

Photo: Michael Vinay Bhatia.

This is the obituary from the Watson Institute, where he had been involved in a research project:

Michael Vinay Bhatia ’99 died yesterday in Afghanistan, where he as working as a social scientist in consultation with the US Defense Department.

In addition to graduating magna cum laude in international relations from Brown University, Michael was a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute from July 2006 to June 2007. At the Institute, he was involved in a research project on Cultural Awareness in the Military, writing his PhD dissertation, and teaching a senior seminar on “The US Military: Global Supremacy, Democracy and Citizenship.”

Over several years, Michael’s research and humanitarian work took him to such conflict zones as Sahrawi refugee camps, East Timor, and Kosovo, in addition to Afghanistan.

Of his work in Afghanistan, Michael wrote in November: “The program has a real chance of reducing both the Afghan and American lives lost, as well as ensuring that the US/NATO/ISAF strategy becomes better attuned to the population’s concerns, views, criticisms and interests and better supports the Government of Afghanistan.”

The dissertation he was working on at Oxford University is titled “The Mujahideen: A Study of Combatant Motives in Afghanistan, 1978-2005.” Bhatia had previously done research in Afghanistan for the Overseas Development Institute, the Small Arms Survey, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, the UK Department for International Development (via the International Policy Institute, King’s College, London) — and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The book he co-authored with Mark Sedra, “Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament and Security in a Post-war Society,” is due to be released this summer. You can see a recent photo essay by Bhatia here, part II here and part III here. It is in these essays that you will find Bhatia’s high level of respect and sympathy for the people of Afghanistan.

Instead of sitting on the sidelines and complaining, like most of us do, Michael Bhatia got involved on the ground and put himself at enormous risk. And that’s why I have such enormous respect for the guy.

[Note added: I did not know Michael Bhatia personally, only by his solid reputation.]

Updates:

• Reuters story on the attack
• Watson Institute Obituary

Final Update: Please visit The QWU Blog, where there is a personal tribute from a friend plus all the links to new about Michael Bhatia’s life and his passing. Any remaining questions you may have will likely be answered there.

If you’ve been reading in the blogosphere about Afghanistan lately you may have come across the debate regarding road building in Afghanistan. It started with an article by David Kilcullen, who has been hanging out in Afghanistan a lot recently. The article argues for the benefits of new roads in the counterinsurgency effort. This led to much debate, concurrence and/or criticism at Registan.net, [My] State Failure Blog, Kings of War and Abu Durkha Durkha.

Photo: Story about Army engineer road builders here.

I didn’t post an entry on the debate, and I probably should have. Do I have an opinion? I do. So here it goes: destroy all Afghan roads.

What!? Really? No, not really. But that is sort of what my secret Afghan informer told me the US should do to Afghan roads, specifically the ones leading to Pakistan. I informed him of a debate occurring on the practice of road building in Eastern Afghanistan and asked his opinion, being that he is an Afghan government technocrat. He said:

“Eastern Afghanistan? They should destroy all the roads there because they go to Pakistan. They should destroy the roads, the airways, the trails for horses, the water should not go [flow] to Pakistan….”

At this point some of his cohorts started adding their ideas for what should be destroyed. I believe “underground ways” was added to the destruction list and “birds should not fly to there” was thrown in for effect. I’ll just put that down as “destroy avian migratory routes that lead to Pakistan.”

But I don’t endorse the destruction of Afghans roads. They obviously need some work.

Photo by John D McHugh (of course). Story here.

Anyways, they were not being serious. They were just venting (in a rather jovial manner). Pakistan-bashing is like a national sport for some Afghans. Its popularity rivals buzkashi. I endorse buzkashi, but not Pakistan-bashing.

While American universities are generally the scene of complacency and disinterest, universities elsewhere are still filled with a decent number of radicals. Is Kabul University one of them? CSM reports:

On the sprawling, serene campus of Kabul University, where the nation sends many of its best and brightest, the Taliban has reached an unprecedented level of influence, students say.

Young men gather in campus dorm rooms and watch slickly produced DVDs of the latest insurgent attacks. One video shows Taliban fighters firing rocket launchers and shrieking, “God is the greatest!” as orange fireballs reach their targets, presumably Coalition forces, in the distance. The attacks are set to religious music, backed by a staccato drumbeat meant to impassion and inspire viewers.

“Many of us have contact with Taliban leadership,” says one student and Taliban member, who asked to be called Naqibullah. “I talk to commanders based in the south maybe once a week on the phone.” Naqibullah and others like him disseminate Taliban propaganda throughout the university, hoping especially to reach students from various parts of the country.

Maybe young Naqib is full of sh*t. Or he could be the real thing.

Naqibullah suggests that places like Kabul University might be a fertile recruiting ground for operations in the capital and in northern areas of the country. “There are many students waiting to launch suicide attacks,” he says. “One student launched a suicide attack in Bagram,” an American base north of the capital.

“I, too, would like to become a suicide bomber,” Naqibullah continues. “But educated Taliban like me are needed to teach the uneducated ones.” Instead, the young man is training to become a doctor so he can eventually treat the war wounds of Taliban fighters.

How valiant of Naqib.

I generally have a good laugh at campus radicals because they are usually posers who never go on to accomplish anything. Except when they realize how lame they are and then apply to law school and then go into private practice and makes some good money (basically the plot of SLC Punk).

Anti-Bush and Anti-Almirt [Olmert] demonstration by KU students:

But students in Afghanistan are not all posers. Both Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were in Kabul University’s engineering department. And more than a few Hizbis were recruited on campus. The old days at KU can be described as Marxists versus Islamists, with the majority of students just wanting to complete their education. But the extreme ends of the political spectrum at KU both produced many foot-soldiers and leaders.

And how about Kabul University in the post-2001 era? I’ve heard several anecdotes of intimidation by Islamists (usually identified problematically as “conservatives”) and of indoctrination by Islamist professors. But I’ve also heard that American universities are run by America-hating Marxists professors who are brain-washing their students. That is, of course, pretty stupid. It’s easy to find a few horror stories when you are drawing from 4182 universities and colleges. So I carry my skepticism over to the Kabul University anecdotes. I’m sure there are some grumpy old “conservatives” teaching there in certain faculties and I’m sure that there are students who get off on watching jihadi snuff videos from Pakistan. But I don’t think KU will be the epicenter of anything beyond the standard college student narcissism and delusions of grandeur. The number of recruits that KU could provide is sure to be minuscule. I’m sure most students are more concerned with studying or socializing, just like American students.

Or maybe I’m wrong and the next generation of Hekmatyars will emerge from KU.

A serene corner of the KU campus, pic by ZaraAt:

I was reading a blog entry over at Kotare (The Strategist) about the redrawing of borders, and about Jeffrey Goldberg’s hypothetical map of the new middle east (also discussed at Coming Anarchy):

Of course, this reminded me of Ralph Peter’s infamous map:

Ralph Peters, a retired US Army Lt.Col. and author, had written an article in Armed Forces Journal that included the above map. The article was met with the usual amount of skepticism and criticism that any proposed border redrawing proposal receives (including in the same journal). But the hypothetical redrawing was in the independent-private Armed Forces Journal and was written by a retired officer who is out of the loop. So what?

Well, the result was some serious paranoia on the part of some people in the middle east. Certain parties were sure that this was a signal of White House intentions and the borders were fiercely debated. I would say these people are taking things a little too seriously, but then again the establishment of the state of Israel and the war in Iraq were signaled well ahead of time as well. Of course, I consider this the musings of a bored old soldier. But the map was not redrawing any borders where I live.

Closer to my area of focus, there are private proposals for new borders that affect Afghanistan. To start with, here is a map of Pashtunistan:

Pashtunistan? Some people are very serious about Pashtunistan, including some people very close to Karzai. Notice how Afghanistan has consistently refused to recognize the Durand Line? The dream lives on.

The flag of Pashtunistan:

Some like to reminisce about the good old days of the Durrani Empire:

But realistically, they’ll settle for Pashtunistan plus the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan all rolled up into one state. Of course, this would require just a wee bit of extra effort. Might the government of Pakistan resist? Of course. Would the Baluchis and Dardic-speaking people up north be happy about being included in a Greater Afghanistan? Probably not. And how about Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, etc…? The new state would completely marginalize them demographically.

This is all speculation of course. But are some people in Afghanistan and Pakistan waiting, watching and hoping? Absolutely. And some of them are in Karzai’s inner circle. Stranger cartographic events have occurred.

This month’s header is cropped from a photo by Robert W Kranz.

The caption that went along with the pic said this:

Khost, Afghanistan, 07.11.2002: Mohammad, one of the more angry young Pashtun fighters. He was just over 24, but had been with various commanders as long as he could think.They had been his family after the Russians killed his parents and now he was manning a surveillance post in the mountains just west of Khost.

It’s safe to assume that Mohammad was at the time in one of those “good guy” Afghan local militias. Today he is possibly in the Afghan National Army or Police. Or maybe in some loosely aligned Neo-Taliban outfit. Or maybe he has found a civilian job. Or maybe he is unemployed. Who knows.

This is a 45 second video of Soviets ambushing mujahideen in Afghanistan:

What I’m trying to illustrate here is an argument I’ve made before. The Soviets defeated the mujahideen again and again. Even after the Soviets withdrew, the Afghan communist government throttled the mujahideen at Jalalabad. But the Soviets and their local allies created a massive refugee flow that provided the base for jihad in the safe haven of Pakistan. That safe haven still exists and US/NATO is, like the Soviets, handing the opposition casualties in a very favorable proportion.

The Pakistani safe haven: Что делать? What is to be done?

This is interesting. Photo by babs alink.

Misspelling? Or are there female officers around this part of Kunar?

This is not Kunar, and it’s not the police, but it is pretty damn cool (via afghanistanica):

But the drugs can sure give them that extra bit of bravery (AKA total disregard for personal safety) or whatever else it offers (calming the nerves or keeping you awake). There are many example out there, especially from Africa, where some soldiers/boys with guns are given meth (much more than Navy pilots got). Here is an example of the Afghan variety: marijuana-using ANA soldiers in action.

Now that was a fine example of almost complete disregard for personal safety. Also surprising is that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation found time in between all those ice hockey games to broadcast a documentary. Very commendable.

And “spliff?” I thought only anti-drug activists from the 1980s say “spliff.”